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TITLE TO PROPERTY, TITLE TO MARRIAGE:  
THE SOCIAL FOUNDATION OF ADVERSE 
POSSESSION AND COMMON LAW 
MARRIAGE 
John L. McCormack∗ 
I.  INTRODUCTION 
Property and marriage are both ancient and nearly universal social 
institutions.  Property defines relationships between persons and society 
with regard to assets, resources, or other objects of value.  Marriage 
defines relationships between the spouses individually and between the 
spouses and society.  Both institutions involve social positions (“owner” 
or “spouse”) that may be acquired formally or informally.  An individual 
may acquire property owned by another by formal transfer or 
informally, by adverse possession.  Similarly, legal marriages may be 
created formally, by license and approved ceremony, or informally by 
proof of a common law marriage or by other means.1 
Superficially, the legal doctrines of adverse possession and common 
law marriage appear to have little or nothing in common.  Nevertheless, 
commentators have observed similarities between these apparently 
unrelated doctrines.  Legal historian Hendrik Hartog observed that in 
nineteenth century America, a spouse might lose the “title” to his 
marriage by not acting to challenge a subsequent informal marriage 
entered into by his spouse.2  “But, as with adverse possession in property 
law, so in these cases the ‘rightful title holder’ could eventually lose the 
capacity to challenge the marriage if he sat on his rights in the face of his 
wife’s ‘open and notorious’ adultery (i.e., living as the wife of another 
                                      
∗ Professor of Law, Loyola University Chicago School of Law.  The author 
acknowledges the valuable comments of Professors Jane Locke, Stephanie Stern, William 
Whitford, Celeste Hammond, and Jerry Norton.  Ms. Kira Wallisch provided helpful 
criticism and research assistance.  Judge Louise Tesmer, Dean David Yellen, and Associate 
Dean Spencer Waller contributed support and encouragement. 
1 See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.401(a), 2.402 (Vernon 2005).  In Texas, the existence 
of an informal marriage may be established by proof of a common law marriage in “a 
judicial, administrative, or other proceeding” or the execution and registration of a 
“declaration of informal marriage” by the parties on a government prescribed form.  Id.  
Also, an informal marriage could become legally valid by proof of a ceremonial, formal 
marriage that did not, in fact, take place. 
2 Hendrik Hartog, Marital Exits and Marital Expectations in Nineteenth Century America, 
80 GEO. L.J. 95, 123 (1991). 
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man).”3  Chief Judge Richard Posner has also perceived a similitude 
between the two doctrines, stating: 
[c]ommon law marriage is thus to domestic relations law 
what the doctrine of adverse possession is to property 
law a way of curing formal defects in a legal status.  And 
just as a person who has acquired title by adverse 
possession has as good a title as someone who acquires 
it by a formal conveyance, so a common law spouse has 
the same rights as any other spouse.4 
The doctrines are alike in conferring legal statuses (“owner” or 
“spouse”) on individuals who have behaved as if they actually had 
them, even though the formal requirements for acquiring those statuses 
were not satisfied.5  In adverse possession, the status is “owner” and 
relates to property, real or personal.6  With reference to common law 
marriage, the status is “spouse” and relates to another individual who 
also has the status of “spouse.” 
Both doctrines require communication indicating that the individual 
holds the legal status of owner or spouse.  A person who claims the 
status of spouse through common law marriage must show that the 
couple “h[e]ld themselves out’ to the world as married.”7  Adverse 
possession generally has to be “actual” and “open and notorious[.]”8  In 
                                      
3 Id. 
4 Barron v. Apfel, 209 F.3d 984, 986 (7th Cir. 2000) (Posner, C.J.).  See also Jessica A. 
Clarke, Adverse Possession of Identity: Radical Theory, Conventional Practice, 84 OR. L. REV. 563, 
564 (2005).  Clarke also sees a similarity between adverse possession and common law 
marriage: 
In each case, the elements of a legal claim are strikingly similar: 
physical proximity, notoriety and publicity, a claim of right, consistent 
and continuous behavior, and public acquiescence.  Moreover, while 
the law protects the interests of the parties immediately concerned, 
protection of third-party interests and social expectations turns out to 
be the dispositive factor in each case. 
Id. 
5 See BRUCE J. BIDDLE & EDWIN J. THOMAS, ROLE THEORY: CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH 67-
69 (1966). 
6 See Patty Gerstenblith, The Adverse Possession of Personal Property, 37 BUFF. L. REV. 119, 
120 (1988-89) (discussing adverse possession of personal property). 
7 See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 105 
(2d ed. 1988). 
8 WILLIAM B. STOEBUCK & DALE A. WHITMAN, THE LAW OF PROPERTY 854 (3d ed. 2000); 
see also Steven A. Bibas, Note, The Case Against Statutes of Limitations for Stolen Art, 103 YALE 
L.J. 2437, 2441-43 (1994) (noting that the “open and notorious” requirement is harder to 
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other words, common law spouses must have acted married and adverse 
possessors of real estate must have behaved as owners, so as to 
communicate that they were spouses or owners.  Finally, adverse 
possessors must have acted like owners for a substantial period of time.9  
By contrast, the common law marriage doctrine of most jurisdictions 
does not require any specific period of acting married.10  Even though no 
specific period of so acting is normally required, available evidence 
suggests that common law marriage claims may be more likely to prevail 
if there was an extended period of cohabitation.11 
Adverse possession and common law marriage make more probable 
that those who hold themselves out as owners or spouses will be treated 
as owners or spouses under the law.12  Consequently, the doctrines may 
serve to protect expectations of adverse possessors, spouses of informal 
marriages, and the people who interact with them. 
This Article will show that adverse possession and common law 
marriage are related legal doctrines in that they share a common social 
foundation, a core component of human social ordering, which legal 
                                                                                    
apply in adverse possession of personal property cases because it may move and land does 
not). 
9 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. 5/13-101 (2006) (twenty years); NEV. REV. STAT. ANN. § 11.150 
(LexisNexis 1998) (five years); OR. REV. STAT. ANN. § 105.620 (West 2005) (ten years); UTAH 
CODE ANN. § 78-12-12 (2002) (seven years). 
10 For a statute that required a specific period, see e.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 457:39 
(LexisNexis 2007) (New Hampshire statute requiring at least a three year period of 
cohabitation); Clarke, supra note 4, at 571 n.32; H.R. 427, 2005 Gen. Ct., 159th Sess. (N.H. 
2005) (a 2005 bill to repeal this statute and abolish common law marriage that was 
introduced in the New Hampshire House). 
11 CLARK, supra note 7, at 105 (stating that there are cases that go a long way toward 
basing a holding of common law marriage upon well established and long continued 
cohabitation). 
12 See Walter O. Weyrauch, Informal and Formal Marriage―An Appraisal of Trends in Family 
Organization, 28 U. CHI. L. REV. 88 (1960) (describing types of informal marriages other than 
Common law marriage, including putative marriage and marriage by proxy or estoppel).  
See also LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 202-04 (2d ed. 1985).  A 
“formal marriage” is one that complies with state prescribed formalities (which may 
include a license and ceremony) for contracting a marriage.  Id.  The term “common law 
marriage” refers to an American legal doctrine that may make some informal marriages 
legally effective.  Id.  England had various forms of legally recognized informal marriage.  
Id.  On the continent, a legal marriage could be completed by a contract between the parties 
until the middle of the sixteenth century when the Council of Trent prescribed a ceremony 
and certain formalities.  Id.  Lord Hardwicke’s Act (1753) generally abolished informal 
marriage in England by giving the Church of England and the state the sole power to form 
marriages and to publicize them to society.  Id.  See also Stuart J. Stein, Common-Law 
Marriage: Its History and Certain Contemporary Problems, 9 J. FAM. L. 271, 272 (1969). 
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philosopher Lon Fuller13 called the “language of interaction.”14  Basically, 
the language of interaction includes shared norms that tell people how to 
behave and the likely behavior they may expect from others in various 
social contexts.  This Article will show how adverse possession and 
marriage-like cohabitation generate expectations that there is ownership 
or a marriage.  At some point, these expectations eventually may lead to 
legally binding conclusions that the parties are owners or spouses, even 
without any showing of reliance on them. 
After showing how adverse possession and common law marriage 
function to make more reliable expectations of ownership or marriage 
based on persons acting like owners or those in a marriage, this Article 
then considers whether adverse possession or common law marriage 
doctrine should be modified, abolished, or extended.   
When social norms15 become a basis of laws, those laws may tend to 
persist even when the social and economic conditions that gave rise to 
them have changed or disappeared.  For example, adverse possession 
originated when the distinction between ownership and possession was 
blurred or nonexistent and where there were no comprehensive, 
centralized systems of property records that could be used to identify 
owners and what they owned.  Currently, governmentally maintained 
central registries (recording or title registration) effectively publicize 
most real estate claims in the developed world.  Continued recognition 
of adverse possession of real estate in its present form is contrary to the 
policy behind recording and registration laws that title should be 
ascertainable by examining governmentally maintained records.  To 
justify retention of the adverse possession doctrine, some sufficient 
modern policy should be identified. 
For personal property claims, there are a limited number of 
governmental and private registries.  For example, there are registries for 
motor vehicles and certain pedigreed animals.16  Because of the absence 
                                      
13 The late Lon Fuller was a Professor of Law at the law schools of the University of 
Oregon, Duke University, and Harvard University. 
14 See LON L. FULLER, THE PRINCIPLES OF SOCIAL ORDER 213 (Kenneth I. Winston ed., 
1981) (referring to “customary law[,]” which was the basis of “a language of interaction”). 
15 Here the term “norm” is used to refer to what people believe that they may expect 
from others and what others may expect from them in particular social contexts.  Norms 
define these expectations.  See FULLER, supra note 14, at 148; JOSE LOPEZ & JOHN SCOTT, 
SOCIAL STRUCTURE 24-26 (2000). 
16 See Bibas, supra note 8, at 2468; Bruce W. Burton, In Search of John Constable’s the White 
Horse: A Case Study in Tortured Provenance and Proposal for a Torrens-Like System of Title 
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of effective central registries for personal property claims, there may be a 
greater need for adverse possession or other doctrines to determine the 
priority or validity of those claims. 
However, with regard to real estate, there is some evidence that 
adverse possession may be completely dispensable.17  But adverse 
possession does serve to cure some title problems, mainly caused by 
deficiencies in recording systems, and to resolve boundary disputes.  
There are two types of adverse possession: “short-term” commonly 
“under color of title”18 and “long-term.”19  Short-term adverse possession 
is a needed and useful title-clearing tool, and clearing title for persons in 
possession holding under invalid written conveyances (“color of title”) 
justifies its retention.  However, long-term adverse possession is an 
anachronism no longer adequately justified by any contemporary 
interest or policy.  Its boundary dispute settling function can be 
performed by other doctrines, collectively referred to as “practical 
location of boundaries.”  These doctrines are focused on boundary 
dispute cases and are capable of resolving them at least as efficiently as 
adverse possession without the anomalous results that adverse 
possession sometimes produces.20 
                                                                                    
Registration for Artwork, 59 FLA. L. REV. 531 (2007) (proposing official registration systems 
for artwork). 
17 American Torrens title registration laws usually prohibit any adverse possession of 
registered land.  See, e.g., MINN. STAT. ANN. § 508.02 (West 2002); Konantz v. Stein, 167 
N.W.2d 1, 5 (Minn. 1969).  Adverse possession is contrary to a basic Torrens policy, that the 
actual title and the title shown in the register ideally should be identical.  However, 
boundaries are not normally registered for practical reasons.  If there is an application to 
register boundaries that will be binding on neighbors, they must be notified and given an 
opportunity to be heard.  See, e.g., Julie A. Bergh, The Torrens System, in REAL ESTATE LAW 
(Minn. Practice Series) § 3.32 (Eileen M. Roberts ed., 2006).  Otherwise, there may be a 
taking of their property without due process of law.  In Minnesota, practical location of 
boundaries has been applied to Torrens registered land in some exceptional cases.  Id. at 
§ 3.24.  Traditionally, lands owned by federal, state, or local governments are not subject to 
adverse possession.  Currently, adverse possession of government owned land in some 
instances is permitted.  See, e.g., Color of Title Act, 43 U.S.C. § 1068 (2000). 
18 James H. Backman, The Law of Practical Location of Boundaries and the Need for an Adverse 
Possession Remedy, 1986 BYU L. REV. 957, 959-61 (1986). 
19 Id. 
20 For example, in rare instances, adverse possession has enabled squatters to “steal” 
land from owners, however, reported adverse possession cases usually involve parties who 
have adjoining or nearby parcels.  Nonetheless, squatter cases have fascinated some 
scholars.  See generally, Lee Anne Fennell, Efficient Trespass: The Case for “Bad Faith” Adverse 
Possession, 100 NW. U. L. REV. 1037 (2006) (providing economic and other theories to 
explain or justify the squatter cases); Eduardo Moisés Peñalver & Sonia K. Katyal, Property 
Outlaws, 155 U. PA. L. REV. 1095, 1169-71 (2007) (same). 
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While long-term adverse possession is an anachronism, common law 
marriage doctrine appears today to be more in harmony with presently 
accepted—but by no means universal—social values and norms than 
ever before. 
With some exceptions, largely involving the rights of children, 
modern law reflects a general policy that the internal affairs of a 
marriage are private matters between the partners.21  Contemporary 
legal norms applicable to marriage generally have very little to say about 
what each party may expect from the other within the relationship.22  
The parties are generally free to form those expectations themselves.  The 
legal norms do not buttress the dominance of the husband as they once 
did.  The reciprocal traditional duties of the wife to provide certain 
services and of the husband to provide support have largely disappeared 
from general social norms of marriage and are disappearing from the 
law as well.23  In fact, whether the parties are actually legally married is 
only relevant in a few situations, mainly those involving legal property 
or benefit and entitlement rights.24 
Today, many believe that people should be able to form domestic 
partnerships without having to get approval from government or 
elsewhere.25  At the same time, people believe that domestic partners 
should be able to adopt a legally defined social status that includes rights 
and responsibilities for their partnership.26  The American Law Institute 
has promulgated model legislation that reflects this belief.27 
                                      
21 Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law, 1992 WIS. L. REV. 1443 (1992); Katherine 
Shaw Spaht, The Last One Hundred Years: The Incredible Retreat of Law from the Regulation of 
Marriage, 63 LA. L. REV. 243 (2003). 
22 This has been true for a long time.  See FULLER, supra note 14, at 149. 
23 Twila L. Perry, The “Essentials of Marriage:”  Reconsidering the Duty of Support and 
Services, 15 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1 (2003). 
24 Diane S. Kaplan, Why Truth is Not a Defense in Paternity Actions, 10 TEX. J. WOMEN & L. 
69 (2000).  Whether parties are actually married may be material in some paternity cases.  
Id.  Existence of a legal marriage is a basis of the presumption that a child born during a 
marriage is the child of both spouses.   Id.  With scientific advances in DNA identification, 
it is questionable whether this presumption will remain viable.  Id. 
25 Edward A. Zelinsky, Deregulating Marriage: The Pro-Marriage Case for Abolishing Civil 
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1161, 1163 (2006) (arguing that civil marriage should be 
abolished and it “should become solely a religious and cultural institution with no legal 
definition or status.”); Daniel A. Crane, A “Judeo-Christian” Argument for Privatizing 
Marriage, 27 CARDOZO L. REV. 1221 (2006) (same). 
26 See AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: 
ANALYSIS AND RECOMMENDATIONS § 6.04 (2002).  Generally, property acquired by domestic 
partners will be considered “domestic-partnership property” if it would have been 
classified as marital property if they had been married.  Id.  The partners may be of the 
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Common law marriage seems to reflect recent trends in public 
opinion; however, the doctrine was widely recognized in the nineteenth 
century.  By 1929, it was still authorized by the laws of roughly half the 
states.28  Currently, the doctrine is recognized in only ten states and the 
District of Columbia.29  Opponents of common law marriage used both 
efficiency and moral arguments to support its abolition.  One apparently 
persuasive argument was that formal certified marriage made proof of 
marriage based property rights and other spousal claims, such as for 
entitlement benefits, simpler and more efficient.  Yet, as this Article will 
show, marriage certificates are not very good evidence of the existence of 
a marriage at any particular time30 
II.  ADVERSE POSSESSION AND COMMON LAW MARRIAGE 
A. Adverse Possession 
Adverse possession, in some form, is recognized in all jurisdictions 
in the United States and in other jurisdictions following the common law 
                                                                                    
same or opposite gender and they may make “premarital agreements” to govern their 
relationship.  Id. at §§ 6.03, 7.01. 
27 See generally PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION, supra note 26. 
28 CHESTER G. VERNIER, I AMERICAN FAMILY LAWS § 26 (1931). 
29 The ten states are Alabama, Colorado, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Rhode 
Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.  See also Connell v. Francisco, 898 P.2d 831, 834 
(Wash. 1995) (in which the State of Washington arguably recognized common law 
marriage in the guise of “stable, marital-like relationship.”).  But see PNC Bank Corp. v. 
Worker’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 831 A.2d 1269 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2003) (prospectively 
abolishing common law marriage in Pennsylvania); 23 PA. CONST. STAT. ANN. § 1103 (West 
Supp. 2007) (abolishing common law marriage prospectively effective January 1, 2005); 
Costello v. Worker’s Comp. Appeal Bd., 916 A.2d 1242 (Pa. Commw. Ct. 2007). 
30 There is no centralized reliable source of information that can be used to examine the 
title to a marriage equivalent to the land title records used to assess real estate titles.  It is 
unlikely that such a source will ever exist.  People move—land does not.  Marriages may be 
formed in one jurisdiction and dissolved in another by court judgment or death of a 
spouse.  This makes creation of centralized reliable record usable to examine titles to 
marriages a daunting political and legal task.  Allowing informally married spouses to 
publicly register their marriages should eliminate any proof of marriage advantage of 
formally certified marriage.  See, e.g., TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 2.401 (Vernon 2005).  In Texas, 
a couple may marry by executing a declaration of informal marriage.  Id.  The declaration is 
certified by a County Clerk and recorded.  Id.  A recorded certificate is prima facie evidence 
of marriage.  Id. at § 2.402.  In Texas, couples may also marry informally under the usual 
common law marriage rules without executing and recording a declaration of informal 
marriage.  Id. 
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legal tradition.31  The doctrine—or something like it—is also found in 
countries and societies outside the common law tradition.32 
When a court decides that the formal requirements for adverse 
possession have been satisfied, the adverse possessor gets a legal title to 
the property and the former owner loses it.  There is a related doctrine 
called “prescription” under which an adverse user may acquire an 
easement instead of general ownership.33  After legal validation, a title 
acquired by adverse possession has equal standing with a title acquired 
by conveyance.34 
While jurisdictions may differ in some particulars, the general 
elements necessary for acquiring title by adverse possession are 
essentially similar in all jurisdictions: actual possession that is adverse, 
hostile (without permission of the owner), open, notorious, visible, 
exclusive, and continuous for the statutory period.35  Some jurisdictions 
also require claim of title or right, or good faith.36  In addition to adverse 
possession, certain doctrines applicable to boundary disputes may also 
                                      
31 See 4 HERBERT THORNDIKE TIFFANY & BASIL JONES, TIFFANY REAL PROPERTY § 1132 
(2003) (stating that in jurisdictions in the United States that adopted the Torrens system of 
land title registration, adverse possession of registered land was not initially permitted); 1 
LA. PRAC. REAL EST. § 5:1 (2000) (in Louisiana, a hybrid civil law jurisdiction, the equivalent 
of adverse possession is called “acquisitive prescription”); 10 OLAN B. LOWREY, ADVERSE 
POSSESSION, THOMPSON ON REAL PROPERTY § 87.01 (David A. Thomas ed., 2d. ed. 1998) (in 
the common law tradition, “prescription” commonly refers to acquisition of an easement 
through adverse use). 
32 THOMAS GLYN WATKIN, THE ITALIAN LEGAL TRADITION 218 (1997) (Italian law 
recognizes “usucapione[,]” a concept derived from the Roman law institution of usucapio, 
meaning acquisition of moveable or immovable property by possession for a given length 
of time).  See also ANDREW BORKOWSKI, TEXTBOOK ON ROMAN LAW 200-05 (1994) (stating 
that the Code of Hammurabi (Babylonian, ca 1780 BC) provided for loss of possessory rights 
through a form of adverse possession); ROGER BERNHARDT ET AL., PROPERTY—CASES AND 
STATUTES 46 (2005). 
33 See, e.g., ROMUALDO P. ECLAVEA, ADVERSE POSSESSION AND PRESCRIPTION 2 N.Y. JUR. 2D 
§ 2 (Westlaw 2004). 
34 3 AM. JUR. 2D Adverse Possession § 248 (2002). 
35 3 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 15.2 (A. James Casner ed., 1952) (noting that the 
statutory period is in the statute of limitations applicable to the action that the owner may 
bring to eject the possessor).  See also Lon L. Fuller, Adverse Possession―Occupancy of 
Another’s Land Under Mistake as to Location of a Boundary, 7 OR. L. REV. 329, 329-30 (1928) 
(stating that adverse possession could be reduced to three elements: “(1) Possession must 
be entered into and maintained for the statutory period.  (2) The possession must operate to 
give the owner of the land a cause of action.  (3) The possession must be ‘unaccompanied 
by any recognition, express or inferable from circumstances, of the right’ of the owner.”). 
36 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at 854. 
2008] Adverse Possession and Common Law Marriage 469 
give a party in possession title or other rights despite the owner’s paper 
or record title.37 
Statutes of limitation provide a foundation for adverse possession, 
but most of the legal doctrine is judge-made.  The statutes provide for a 
limited amount of time after a cause of action accrues,38 during which the 
owner of property being adversely possessed may sue to abate the 
conduct.39  Once the time runs out, a lawsuit to recover the land is barred 
by the statute. 
Some statutes provide for short-term adverse possession if some 
additional factors are present.40  For example, in Illinois, the long-term 
statute provides for a period of twenty years.41  However, if the 
possession is also under “color of title” (under a defective written 
conveyance), in good faith, and the possessor pays the real property 
taxes, the short-term statute provides for a period of seven years.42 
                                      
37 See generally Backman, supra note 18, at 958. The set of doctrines is usually referred to 
as “Practical Location of Boundaries.”  Id. 
38 See LOWREY, supra note 31, at § 87.01 (the statutes provide for periods that range from 
five to forty years, with most falling within the ten to twenty year range.); see also R. H. 
Helmholz, Adverse Possession and Subjective Intent, 61 WASH. U. L.Q. 331, 333 (1983) 
(describing a study by Professor Helmholz revealing that courts in actual cases seldom 
approach the subject by determining whether a cause of action accrued against the 
possessor). 
39 See CHARLES C. CALLAHAN, ADVERSE POSSESSION 47-49 (1961) (stating that the 
antecedent of modern statutes of limitation was the Statute 21 Jac. I, c. 16 (1623) which 
concerned actions to recover possession and time limitations on the rights to seek legal 
remedies to vindicate property rights existed for centuries before this statute). 
40 See, e.g., Shane P. Raley, Note, Color of Title and Payment of Taxes: The New Requirements 
Under Arkansas Adverse Possession Law, 50 ARK. L. REV. 489, 496-97 (1997) (stating that the 
possessor must hold title under some written instrument, such as a deed or will, which was 
defective or invalid). 
41 735 ILL. COMP. STAT. § 5/13-101 (2003).  The Illinois statute states: 
Twenty years―Recovery of land.  No person shall commence an action 
for the recovery of lands, nor make an entry thereon, unless within 20 
years after the right to bring such action or make such entry first 
accrued, or within 20 years after he, she or those from, by, or under 
whom he or she claims, have acquired title or possession of the 
premises . . . . 
Id. 
42 Id. at §13-109.  The Illinois statute goes on to state: 
Payment of taxes with color of title.  Every person in the actual 
possession of lands or tenements, under claim and color of title, made 
in good faith, and who for 7 successive years continues in such 
possession, and also, during such time, pays all taxes legally assessed 
on such lands or tenements, shall be held and adjudged to be the legal 
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Actually, the time period in which the owner may sue is not as 
definite as the applicable statute of limitations might indicate.  The 
statute begins to run when a right to sue for recovery of the property 
arises in favor of the owner.  If, at the commencement of possession, the 
owner of real estate is under a legal disability denying the owner 
capacity to sue, the statute will not begin to run until, if ever, the owner 
acquires capacity.43 
Early statutes of limitation did not provide—and numerous modern 
statutes still do not provide—that the adverse possessor becomes the 
owner after the statute runs out.  At the time the doctrine was being 
formed, courts could have held that the running of the statute simply 
protected the possessor from being sued, leaving intact the owner’s 
rights in the property.  Even if an action was barred, self-help could still 
be used to recover possession.  But by 1757, it was held that the effect of 
the statute running out was more than just the barring of a remedy; 
instead, the adverse possessor got a “positive title” and the former 
owner’s title was taken away.44  Finally, in England, the 1833 Real 
Property Limitation Act expressly provided that the running of the 
period of limitation extinguished the right as well as the remedy of the 
previous owner.45 
B. Common Law Marriage 
Common law marriage is a legal doctrine that may give an informal 
marriage legal standing.46  When the requisites for common law 
marriage have been established, the common law spouse is considered a 
legal spouse.  Common law marriages are nearly identical in legal 
standing to licensed formal marriages.47  Furthermore, common law 
                                                                                    
owner of such lands or tenements, to the extent and according to the 
purport of his or her paper title. 
Id.; cf.  LOWREY, supra note 31, at § 87.01 (stating that similar provisions in other states 
provide for periods ranging from three to ten years). 
43 See Helmholz, supra note 38, at 336 (discussing cases involving legal disabilities of 
record or true owners, which are among the exceptional cases that courts analyze by 
considering whether a cause of action accrued). 
44 Taylor v. Horde, 1 Burr. 60, 97 Eng. Rep. 190 (1757). 
45 CALLAHAN, supra note 39, at 50. 
46 See Weyrauch, supra note 12, at 105-06 (explaining that courts have also used other 
doctrines to sanction informal marriages, such as marriage by estoppel, marriage by 
presumption, and marriage by ratification). 
47 See Peter Nash Swisher & Melanie Diana Jones, The Last-in-Time Marriage Presumption, 
29 FAM. L.Q. 409, 427-28 (1995).  Swisher and Jones discuss a minority view that a 
subsequent common law marriage should not be entitled to the last-in-time marriage 
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spouses have essentially the same rights as formally married spouses.48  
In theory, once a common law marriage is formed, the parties are legally 
married and if one of them should subsequently marry another in a 
formal ceremony, the subsequent formal marriage is void and 
bigamous.49 
As of 2007, only ten states and the District of Columbia authorized 
common law marriages.50  However, most states recognize common law 
marriages formed by couples while domiciled in an authorizing 
jurisdiction.51  But, in some states, common law marriages formed 
elsewhere may not be recognized.52 
The legal elements of common law marriage include: (1) capacity to 
make a contract of marriage, (2) a present agreement to marry, (3) 
cohabitation, and (4) a holding out to the community that the parties are 
married.53  “It is frequently said that there is no such thing as a secret, or 
clandestine, common law marriage.”54  In contrast to adverse possession, 
there is generally no legally specified time period that a couple has to 
cohabitate to create a basis for a claim of common law marriage.55 
The elements of common law marriage operate in a context of 
presumptions and allocation of burden of proof.  In some of the states 
that permit common law marriage, it is difficult for a proponent to prove 
                                                                                    
presumption of validity.  Id.  Some judges may be hostile toward common law marriage 
and this may disfavor a claim by a common law marriage spouse.  Id. 
48 Barron, 209 F.3d at 986. 
49 See Crosson v. Crosson, 668 So. 2d 868, 873 (Ala. Ct. Civ. Apps. 1995) (indicating that a 
spouse of the prior marriage may have the burden of proving that the prior marriage was 
legally terminated); see also Swisher & Jones, supra note 47, at 409-10 (arguing that this 
doctrine can have the practical effect of nullifying a marriage that was not, in fact, legally 
terminated). 
50 Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 
957, 1011 (2000).  But see PNC Bank Corp., 831 A.2d at 1281 (in which Pennsylvania 
abolished common law marriage prospectively in 2003). 
51 See Cynthia Grant Bowman, A Feminist Proposal to Bring Back Common Law Marriage, 75 
OR. L. REV. 709, 716 (1996) (explaining, however, that courts in states that do not recognize 
common law marriage sometimes refuse to recognize common law marriages entered into 
by couples domiciled in those states while temporarily residing in jurisdictions that do 
authorize them). 
52 John C. Hurley, Common Law Marriage: Who Is Insured as a Spouse?, THE NATIONAL 
UNDERWRITER COMPANY CLAIMS MAGAZINE, Mar. 2003, at 33. 
53 Id.; see also Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns 52, 4 Am. Dec. 244 (N.Y. 1809); Bowman, supra note 
51, at 712-13. 
54 Bowman, supra note 51, at 713. 
55 Clarke, supra note 4, at 571 n.32. 
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a contract to marry.56  In other states, the contract to marry may be 
presumed from the couple cohabitating and holding themselves out to 
society as married.57  Where this presumption is applied, there will be 
proof of a contract to marry regardless of whether the parties actually 
made one. 
If the contract must be separately proved, the proponent of the 
marriage may face an insurmountable barrier.  Couples in informal 
marriages commonly drift into the relationship intending to be married 
at some point, without a conscious express agreement to be husband and 
wife.58  Even if a contract was expressly made, if one of the spouses is 
deceased, the survivor is likely to be the only living witness.  In some 
jurisdictions, the Dead Man’s Statute may prevent the survivor from 
testifying at all about statements made by the decedent.59  If the survivor 
is permitted to testify about the contract to marry, her or his testimony 
may be given little weight as it is coming from an interested witness. 
In some states that do not formally authorize common law marriage, 
proof of cohabitation and proof that the couple held themselves out as 
being married raises a presumption that a valid ceremonial marriage 
took place.60  Essentially the same facts (cohabitation and holding out) 
that may raise a presumption of an agreement to marry in common law 
marriage jurisdictions support the presumption of a valid ceremonial 
marriage.61 
                                      
56 Stein, supra note 12, at 286. 
57 Bowman, supra note 51, at 715; see also Kathryn S. Vaughn, The Recent Changes to the 
Texas Informal Marriage Statute: Limitation or Abolition of Common Law Marriage?, 28 HOUS. L. 
REV. 1131 (1991); cf. John B. Crawley, Is the Honeymoon over for Common-Law Marriage: A 
Consideration of the Continued Viability of the Common-Law Marriage Doctrine, 29 CUMB. L. 
REV. 399, 407-08 (1999) (explaining that a marriage agreement may be inferred from the 
parties’ circumstances). 
58 Vaughn, supra note 57, at 1153-54. 
59 CLARK, supra note 7, at 106. 
60 Id. at 105; Stein, supra note 12, at 281. 
61 See Stein, supra note 12, at 281; see also King v. Clichfield R.R. Co., 131 F. Supp. 218, 219 
(Tenn. Dist. Ct. 1955).  Applying Tennessee law, the court stated: 
It may be observed that common law marriages have been replaced by 
statutory or ceremonial marriage in Tennessee.  The statement appears 
in Court decisions that Tennessee does not recognize common law 
marriages.  Yet it is well established that where a man and a woman 
live together as husband and wife over a period of years, neither of 
them, nor any third party, may attack their relationship as husband 
and wife. 
Id. 
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To summarize, simply counting the number of states that do or do 
not authorize common law marriages does not give a complete picture of 
the degree to which informal marriages may be legally validated.  Some 
common law marriage states have strict proof requirements for common 
law marriages, making them very difficult to prove.  On the other hand, 
informal marriages may be legally validated under the presumption of 
marriage based on cohabitation and holding out in some states, 
regardless of their positions on common law marriage.  Common law 
marriages may also be given at least some validity through doctrines 
such as marriage by estoppel.62  Finally, common law marriages formed 
in other jurisdictions may be legally validated because of choice of law 
rules, previously discussed. 
III.  PRIOR EXPLANATIONS OF COMMON LAW MARRIAGE ARE 
UNSATISFACTORY 
Numerous commentators have offered rationales for adverse 
possession.63  This is not remarkable.  The doctrine presents an 
interesting and challenging legal puzzle: it may award land to a 
trespasser who diligently pursues the wrong without any compensation 
to the former owner of the property.  By contrast, there have been few 
attempts to explain why common law marriage was accepted as a legal 
form of marriage in the United States.  The most common explanations 
for its legal acceptance are offered by opponents who disapprove of it 
and argue for its non-recognition. 
A. Frontier Conditions 
A common explanation for the recognition of common law marriage 
in some jurisdictions is that it was a response to the “frontier conditions” 
that once existed in them.64  On the frontier, it is argued, travel was slow 
and difficult, and could be dangerous.  Settlements were sparse, making 
it difficult to reach clergy and officials to preside over ceremonial 
                                      
62 Robert E. Kendrick, Informal Marriage in Tennessee—Marriage by Estoppel, by Prescription 
and by Ratification, 3 VAND. L. REV. 610, 615 (1950). 
63 See Bowman, supra note 51, at 731-54 (discussing additional rationales for the abolition 
of common law marriage); see also CALLAHAN, supra note 39, at 82-111; Thomas W. Merrill, 
Property Rules, Liability Rules, and Adverse Possession, 79 NW. U. L. REV. 1122, 1128-33 (1984); 
Jeffrey Evans Stake, The Uneasy Case for Adverse Possession, 89 GEO. L.J. 2419, 2434-56 (2001). 
64 See Ryan P. Newel, Comment,”To Be Sure He is My Husband Good Enough,” or is He?  
An Analysis of Common Law Marriage in Pennsylvania, 109 PENN. ST. L. REV. 337 (2004) 
(providing a recent example of a common law marriage opponent using the frontier 
conditions argument); see also Weyrauch, supra note 12, at 97. 
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marriages.65  Presently, it is argued, marriage licenses may conveniently 
be obtained and clergy or officials authorized to preside are readily 
available.  Accordingly, those who think the doctrine ought to be 
abolished argue that because of a change of circumstances, common law 
marriage is no longer justified.66 
Perhaps informal marriage was a response to conditions on the 
frontier.  The “frontier conditions” argument, however, contains an 
unstated assumption that formal marriage is the ideal and that common 
law marriage, a deviation from that ideal, is justifiable only by special 
circumstances.  A preference favoring formal marriage should be based 
on some significant relevant characteristic that informal marriage lacks, 
and not an unstated assumption. 
The “frontier conditions” argument is also somewhat diminished 
because it does not explain why three states among the original thirteen 
colonies—Massachusetts,67 New York,68 and Pennsylvania69—took 
opposing positions on common law marriage.  Were there “frontier 
conditions” in New York and Pennsylvania that caused acceptance of 
common law marriage in those states that did not exist in Massachusetts, 
which never recognized the doctrine?70  Furthermore, Wyoming has 
never officially recognized common law marriage even though “frontier 
conditions” persisted in that state well into the twentieth century.71 
More importantly, proponents of the “frontier conditions” argument 
base their contention on assumptions about what frontier conditions 
actually were instead of historical records.  Were clergy and judges 
actually so scarce on the frontier?  Was it really so difficult for couples to 
have their marriages solemnized by clergy or judges?  Perhaps the 
historical record would show that these conditions did exist.  But 
without citation of support in the historical record, the “frontier 
condition” argument lacks a credible basis. 
                                      
65 See McChesny v. Johnson, 79 S.W.2d 658, 659 (Tex. Civ. App. 1934); In re Soeder’s 
Estate, 220 N.E.2d 547, 562 (Ohio Ct. App. 1966); see also Bowman, supra note 51, at 717 
(explaining the “frontier conditions” rationale); FRIEDMAN, supra note 12, at 203. 
66 See Roddie Burris, S.C. bill poised to cut ties that bind: Measure advancing in Legislature 
would make common-law marriage illegal, THE STATE, Apr. 12, 2006 (providing a fairly recent 
statement of the frontier conditions argument). 
67 Milford v. Worcester, 7 Mass. 48, 57 (1810). 
68 Fenton v. Reed, 4 Johns 52 (N.Y. 1809). 
69 Rodebaugh v. Sanks, 2 Watts 9 (Pa. 1833). 
70 Commonwealth v. Munson, 127 Mass. 459, 470 (1879). 
71 In re Roberts’ Estate, 133 P.2d 492, 503 (Wyo. 1943). 
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B. Administrative Efficiency and Judicial Economy 
Some argue that formal marriage by licenses and approved 
ceremonies promotes administrative efficiency and judicial economy by 
creating lasting records and certificate evidence of the fact that a couple 
was legally married.72  On the surface, this argument appears to have 
substantial merit, yet upon closer examination, the argument becomes 
less than compelling.  The perception of administrative efficiency is due 
to a seriously inadequate appreciation of what a marriage certificate 
actually may prove. 
It is easier to prove the existence of a certified marriage.  A marriage 
certificate is prima facie evidence of the fact of the marriage.73  Unless 
sufficient contrary evidence is introduced, the certificate will establish 
the existence of the marriage.  However, opponents of common law 
marriage have exaggerated the ease of proof advantage of certified 
marriages.  The comments of an experienced state court judge suggest 
that not a lot of extra judicial and other resources are needed to prove the 
existence of a common law marriage.  “Deciding whether a common-law 
marriage exists does require an additional determination from the 
factfinder, but the controlling elements of that determination are well-
established, easy to apply, and predictable in result.”74 
It may be widely under-appreciated that marriage certificates are not 
very reliable proof of the present existence of a marriage.  Marriage 
certificates are evidence that the parties named were involved in a 
marriage ceremony referred to in the document.  The certificate does not 
generally establish conclusively that the union was valid, that the parties 
then had capacity to marry, that the marriage was not subsequently 
dissolved, or that the people claimed to have been married are the same 
persons named as the parties to the marriage in the certificate.  
Moreover, there is no centralized system of records that can be examined 
to assess the legal history of a marriage—the “title” of a marriage—
similar to the recording systems that enable title examiners to assess real 
estate titles.  Marriages made in one jurisdiction may be dissolved in 
another by court judgment or death. 
                                      
72 See Newel, supra note 64, at 354 (providing a recent statement of this argument, in 
which the involvement of the state or church in the marriage is incidental and not central, 
and other arguments against recognition of common law marriage). 
73 See, e.g., Robert A. Barker & Vincent C. Alexander, Hearsay Exceptions Where 
Availability of the Declarant is Immaterial, in 5 N.Y. PRAC., EVIDENCE IN NEW YORK STATE AND 
FEDERAL COURTS § 8:56 (2006). 
74 Crawley, supra note 57, at 424. 
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Even with the power of the Internet, centralizing the pertinent 
records for the United States and relevant foreign jurisdictions would be 
a costly and arduous legal and political task.  Land does not move, and 
this greatly simplifies centralization of land title record systems.  But in 
modern society many people move from state to state, country to 
country, and jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  The possibility of the movement 
of people and the potential involvement of multiple jurisdictions 
complicate the examination of title to a marriage and the record-keeping 
task.  Furthermore, in federal republics such as the United States, where 
states retain the power to regulate marriage formation, the problem is 
exacerbated by the existence of numerous separate jurisdictions in a 
single nation. 
Not only can people move while land cannot, people can also testify.  
If parties or other witnesses are available, they can testify about the facts 
relevant to the issue of whether two people were married to each other at 
a relevant time.75  Testimony may be used to support or to contradict 
marriage certificates.  It follows that requiring marriages to be formed in 
a ceremony before an authorized official and certified may not achieve as 
much judicial or administrative economy as believed.  In disputes where 
money, other property, or other valuable interests are at stake, the costs 
of litigating the validity of a particular marriage may not be avoidable 
whether the marriage was formed formally or informally, certified or 
not. 
C. Formal Ceremonial Marriage Does Not Provide Any Better Safeguard 
Against Fraud 
Claims of the superiority of ceremonial marriage over common law 
have also been supported by arguments that ceremonial marriages are 
formed in front of witnesses and publicized by registration of 
certificates.76  This procedure, it is claimed, reduces the success of 
fraudulent claims of marriage.77  This was the principal argument that 
led to the abolition of common law marriage in the State of New York in 
1933.78  However, common law marriages must be publicized during 
                                      
75 See John D. Fletcher, Validity of Marriage, 36 AM. JUR. PROOF OF FACTS 2d 441 (2006) 
(providing a comprehensive discussion of various questions and proof or other evidence 
that may be used when the validity of a particular marriage is litigated). 
76 Failure to register a marriage certificate does not invalidate a formal marriage. 
77 See P.M. BROMLEY, FAMILY LAW 27-29 (1971).  This was the ostensible basis of Lord 
Hardwicke’s Act (1853) which generally abolished informal marriage in England and 
required marriage to be performed publicly according to the rite of the Church of England.  
Id. 
78 Dubler, supra note 50, at 1000-03. 
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their existence and will not be recognized unless it is proved that the 
couple publicized their marriage by holding themselves out to their 
community as married.  Any publicity advantage of formal ceremonial 
marriage is further diminished if informally married spouses are 
permitted to register notice of their marriage in public records as they 
presently are in Texas.79 
D. Formal Ceremonial Marriage Does Not Better Protect the Stability of the 
Family 
Protecting the institution of the family is another interest claimed to 
be advanced by licensed ceremonial marriage requirements.  This is a 
worthy goal.  However, formal marriage does not appear to presently 
promote family stability any better than does common law marriage. 
Some who argue that forming marriages exclusively by licenses and 
ceremonies promotes family stability apparently believe that it is easier 
to escape a common law marriage compared to a formal one.  It is no 
harder for formally married spouses to divorce than it is for those in 
common law marriages.  The current national divorce rate for all 
marriages stands at about 50 percent.  A spouse who abandons her or his 
common law spouse and children is just as legally accountable as is a 
formally married person. 
Requiring people to learn the responsibilities of marriage and child 
rearing before they marry may advance the goal of protecting the family.  
Some churches require intended spouses to attend meetings at which the 
responsibilities of marriage are discussed before they will be married in 
the church.80  This requirement may contribute to family stability by 
helping people to appreciate what they are undertaking before the final 
commitment to marriage is made.  Ceremonies may work to impress 
upon people that something serious is happening.  But under prevailing 
formal ceremonial marriage laws, there is nothing in the prescribed 
procedure that assures that the spouses will better understand their 
responsibilities to each other and any children or provides a safeguard 
against marriage by the irresponsible.81 
                                      
79 TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.401-2.402 (Vernon 2006). 
80 Dana Braga, BRIDAL DIARY; Priest Shares the Meaning of Marriage in Pre-Cana Wedding 
Courses, THE PATRIOT LEDGER, Mar. 12, 2005, Fam. Sec., at 10. 
81 See ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-901 (West 2004) (legalizing “covenant marriage[,]” 
which requires premarital counseling, a formal declaration of the permanence of the 
marriage, and grounds for divorce are limited); ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-11-801 (LexisNexis 
2002) (same); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:234, 9:272-275, 9:307-309 (West 2000 & Supp. 2007) 
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IV.  WAS COMMON LAW MARRIAGE ABOLISHED TO PROMOTE RELIGIOUS 
CONTROL OVER FAMILIES, INHERITANCE, AND MORAL HABITS? 
Some commentators argue that marriage was formalized and 
subjected to the jurisdiction of churches so that they could control family 
and inheritance systems as well as moral habits.82  There is support in the 
historical record for this view. 
In the Western cultural tradition, until well into the Christian era, 
marriage and its dissolution was the product of agreements between 
individuals or families.  Organized religion or government played little 
or no role.83  England was not an exception.84  Even after Church 
ceremonies presided over by priests were available and ecclesiastical 
courts claimed exclusive jurisdiction over marriage, England continued 
to recognize informal marriage.85  After the English Reformation, the 
ecclesiastical courts passed jurisdiction over marriage to the Anglican 
Church in 1534.  The Anglican Church sent representatives to the 
Council of Trent (1543-1563), which adopted the position that marriages 
would not be valid unless contracted in the presence of a priest and two 
witnesses.86  At the Council, the Church of England formally endorsed 
this view.  However, the requirement of a religious ceremony was not 
accepted in England and informal marriages were still valid until Lord 
Hardwicke’s Act was passed in 1753.87  The Act provided that a marriage 
was not valid unless it was solemnized according to the rites of the 
Church of England, in church, in the presence of a clergyman and 
                                                                                    
(same); see also Daniel W. Olivas, Comment, Tennessee Considers Adopting the Louisiana 
Covenant Marriage Act: A Law Waiting to be Ignored, 71 TENN. L. REV. 769 (2004) (providing a 
thoughtful critique of covenant marriage laws). 
82 See, e.g., Cecilia A. Green, “A Civil Inconvenience”?  The Vexed Question of Slave Marriage 
in the British West Indies, 25 LAW & HIST. REV. 1, 24 (2007). 
83 JAMES A. BRUNDAGE, LAW, SEX, AND CHRISTIAN SOCIETY IN MEDIEVAL EUROPE 33-35, 66 
(1987); John J. Collins, Marriage, Divorce and Family in Second Temple Judaism, in FAMILIES IN 
ANCIENT ISRAEL 104, 108 (Don S. Browning & Ian S. Evison eds., 1997); Nikos A. 
Vrissimtzis, LOVE, SEX AND MARRIAGE IN ANCIENT GREECE 30 (1995). 
84 See Regina v. Millis, 8 Eng. Rep. 844 (1843) (in which it was incorrectly stated that 
informal marriage never existed in England); Clark, supra note 7, at 70. 
85 Franklin C. Setaro, A History of English Ecclesiastical Law, 18 B.U. L. REV. 102, 119-21 
(1938); Brandy Schnautz Johnson, Note, The Making of Marriage in Thirteenth Century 
England: Verb Tense, Popular Legalism, and the Alexandrine Law of Marriage, 15 TEX. J. WOMEN 
& L. 271 (2006). 
86 GEORGE ELIOT HOWARD, A HISTORY OF MATRIMONIAL INSTITUTIONS 315-16 (1904). 
87 Id. at 435-60. 
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witnesses.88  Ecclesiastical jurisdiction over marriage continued in 
England until the Matrimonial Causes Act was passed in 1857.89 
In the United States, there were never any ecclesiastical courts with 
exclusive jurisdiction over marriage, and from the beginning there was 
separation of church and state.  People wishing to marry formally had 
the alternative of civil ceremonies.  Consequently, requiring people to 
formally marry would not necessarily coerce them into church 
marriages.  The movement to abolish common law marriage in the 
United States that began near the beginning of the twentieth century and 
continued throughout, was not simply a matter of organized religions 
attempting to exercise control over people and their lives. The movement 
continued over a very long period of time driven by the powerful engine 
of social conformity. Two scholars have recently examined the abolition 
of common law marriage in New York90 and California.91  In both states, 
abolition by legislation was preceded by highly publicized cases 
involving younger women who claimed property from older men or 
their estates as common law spouses.  The notion that common law 
marriage could be used by an “adventuress” to appropriate money or 
other property from wealthy men may have motivated or influenced 
legislators’ votes.  Women were not the sole gender allegedly aided in 
taking advantage of the other by the existence of common law marriage.  
It was also attacked on the ground that it facilitated the schemes of 
unscrupulous men who wished to take advantage of young women.92  
Current lobbyists supporting abolition of common law marriage would 
be politically unwise to use the “adventuress” argument.  Instead, 
contemporary opponents claim, among other things, that common law 
marriage undermines the family or is archaic or inefficient.93 
Legislatures are relatively tiny groups of people compared to the 
populations they represent.  Legislators may react to a wide variety of 
influences, events, or arguments at any given time.  The movement to 
abolish common law marriage was sustained and continued over many 
                                      
88 Id. 
89 Setaro, supra note 85, at 119-21. 
90 Dubler, supra note 50, at 957. 
91 Charlotte K. Goldberg, The Schemes of Adventuresses: The Abolition and Revival of 
Common-Law Marriage, 13 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 483 (2007). 
92 Id. at 513. 
93 See, e.g., “Quick Fix” on child brides: AG wants 21 as common-law marriage age, THE 
DENVER POST, June 22, 2006, at A-01. 
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decades.  As the movement continued, various arguments were used to 
influence legislators or other lawmakers at different times.94 
In all societies, there are powerful forces for conformity.  When 
formal marriage became the norm through the efforts of organized 
religions and others, informal marriage became viewed as aberrant 
behavior and was discouraged.  Over decades, people were convinced 
by a variety of arguments that formal ceremonial marriage was so 
preferable to common law marriage that the latter should be prohibited.  
Forces for conformity aided the process of persuasion.  As Professor 
Charlotte Goldberg demonstrates, the great irony is that as common law 
marriage is being abolished, new forms of it are being accepted and even 
authorized by law.95 
V.  RATIONALES FOR ADVERSE POSSESSION 
Some people are surprised when they learn about the adverse 
possession doctrine for the first time because it strikes them as approving 
and rewarding theft.  Adverse possession enables a person to “steal” 
another person’s property by using it for a long time.  Surprise is 
understandable given prevailing social norms that generally disapprove 
of theft. 
A. There is No Single, All Encompassing Satisfactory Explanation for Adverse 
Possession 
The law in action is complex human behavior, which often does not 
lend itself to easy explanation.  Adverse possession is no different.  No 
single rationale for adverse possession is completely satisfactory.  
Nonetheless, people have used various disciplines and approaches to 
produce apparently helpful insights into the operation and foundations 
of the doctrine.  The common rationales include: avoiding problems 
caused by lost evidence, quieting titles to property, penalizing owners 
who do not protect their rights or rewarding those who do, encouraging 
the use of property, and protecting or recognizing reliance interests of 
adverse possessors and those with whom they deal.96  Additionally, 
                                      
94 See supra Part III (considering some of the arguments supporting the abolition of 
Common law marriage). 
95  Goldberg, supra note 91, at 525-38; AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF FAMILY 
DISSOLUTION (2002). 
96 See JESSE DUKEMINIER ET AL., PROPERTY 112-15 (2006) (providing quotations or 
references to various works containing rationales for adverse possession). 
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economic explanations have been presented.97  These rationales vary in 
persuasiveness. 
1. The “Punishment/Reward” Rationales 
Some cases upholding adverse possession claims suggest that they 
are punishing owners who are not diligent in protecting their rights and 
rewarding possessors who are diligent is pursuing theirs.98  The 
prototype Statute of Limitations enacted in 1623 said nothing about 
punishing or rewarding owners or adverse possessors.  Instead, it began 
with: “For quieting of men’s estates. . . .”99 
Courts and commentators have realized that merely punishing 
owners and rewarding adverse possessors is, by itself, not a persuasive 
rationale for the doctrine.100  Regardless of any economic constructs that 
may purport to justify punishing people for not defending their property 
and rewarding others for taking it, theft is against public policy and is no 
complement to social order and productive economic activity.  Such 
activity is difficult, at best, in an environment of social disorder. 
Some have argued that adverse possession rewards those who use 
property and punishes owners who do not because using land resources 
is good and not using them is bad.  This belief might have been 
appropriate in the nineteenth century United States when the national 
economy was developing and conservation of natural resources was not 
broadly valued.  During that era, adverse possession of undeveloped 
land might have been perceived by development-favoring judges as 
good.101  However, within the past forty years, the value of conserving 
resources and leaving lands undeveloped has become widely 
                                      
97 Thomas J. Miceli & C.F. Sirmans, An Economic Theory of Adverse Possession, 15 INT’L 
REV. L. & ECON. 161 (1995); Jeffry M. Netter, Philip L. Hersch & William D. Manson, An 
Economic Analysis of Adverse Possession Statutes, 6 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 217 (1986). 
98 See STOEBUCK & WHITMAN, supra note 8, at 853-60;  Schiller v. Kucaba, 203 N.E.2d 710, 
715 (Ill. App. Ct. 1964) (barring plaintiff from challenging the title defendants acquired by 
adverse possession because plaintiff’s grantors were guilty of laches, stating that “[c]ourts 
of equity aid the diligent and not the indolent.”). 
99 See CALLAHAN, supra note 39, at 92. 
100 See Hirshfield v. Schwartz, 110 Cal. Rptr. 2d. 861, 875 (Cal. Ct. App. 2001) (“Adverse 
possession and prescriptive easements express a preference for use, rather than disuse, of 
land.  They are designed not to reward the taker or punish the dispossessed, but to reduce 
litigation and preserve the peace by protecting long-standing possession.”). 
101 See John G. Sprankling, An Environmental Critique of Adverse Possession, 79 CORNELL L. 
REV. 816, 841-46 (1994) (making the case that in order to further a policy of economic 
development, nineteenth century courts adopted a rule that an adverse possessor could 
prevail through temporary, sporadic use of “wild lands”). 
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appreciated.  Economic exploitation of land is no longer generally 
assumed to be for the good.102 
A recent article presents a variation on the Punishment/Reward 
rationale, in which the authors argue that adverse possession may serve 
as a redistributive mechanism.103  Building on an argument that bad faith 
adverse possession can be justified in utilitarian terms,104 the authors 
argue that squatters on urban land should have the benefit of short 
statutes of limitations (one or two years) to facilitate their acquisition of 
abandoned property.105  They assert that “reasonably attentive owners” 
would not incur significant monitoring costs in urban areas “where it is 
virtually impossible for even the most careless owner not to notice an 
adverse possessor’s use of her land.”106 
There are some serious problems with this proposal.  It assumes, 
without empirical support, that owners of urban land would be 
positioned to frequently monitor their land.  If such a short statute of 
limitations were to be enacted, it is possible that cases would arise where 
the owners were poor, ill, or uneducated.  If the goal is to promote 
“efficient trespass,” the personal characteristics of the parties are 
irrelevant. 
It would also be more difficult to defend such a short statute of 
limitations for rural or wilderness land.  Limiting application to urban 
land only would present other problems.  The statute would have to 
define urban land and the differential treatment of non-urban land 
would have to be constitutionally justified.  In any event, a very short 
                                      
102 A related but distinctly different rationale for adverse possession is that it may be 
justified as a redistributive mechanism.  See Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 20, at 1169-71.  
With urban squatters in mind, this recent article suggests that adverse possession may 
contribute to social good by enabling poor city dwellers to acquire apparently abandoned 
homes or home sites.  Id.  Under present statutes which require possession for seven years 
or more, urban squatters are likely to have the land sold out from under them by a tax sale 
before the statute would run out because persons who abandon land normally do not pay 
the taxes.  Id.  Peñalver and Katyal propose that the statutory period be reduced to one or 
two years.  Id. at 1171.  They also assert that true owners may protect their rights with 
“relative ease.”  Id. at 1146.  Regardless of what that means, there is no doubt that a much-
shortened statutory period would increase monitoring costs.  They also do not appear to 
take into account the various contexts that adverse possession may operate in within a 
single jurisdiction: urban, suburban, country, and wilderness.  Finally, a one or two year 
statute may be unconstitutional as a taking of property without due process of law. 
103 See generally id. 
104 Fennell, supra note 20, at 1038. 
105 Peñalver & Katyal, supra note 20, at 1171. 
106 Id. 
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statute of limitations may be held to involve an unconstitutional taking 
of property without due process of law. 
It is also problematic that legislators and judges would be willing to 
accept the economic justification for “efficient trespass.”  Finally, 
assuming that the argument for efficient trespass is economically sound, 
judges and policymakers may be inclined to be persuaded by moral 
arguments and the notion that theft is wrong and reject the efficiency 
argument.107 
2. The Lost Evidence and Quieting Title Rationales 
The lost evidence rationale is familiar to most law graduates.  It has 
been used to justify statutes of limitation applicable to various kinds of 
litigation and not just to lawsuits brought to assert property claims.  
Essentially, the argument is that as time passes, it becomes increasingly 
difficult or more costly to prove facts in litigation.  Evidence is lost and 
memories fade.108  The tranquility of society and the stability gained by 
giving plaintiffs a limited amount of time to sue—or lose the right—is a 
substantial social interest.  However, the lost evidence rationale for 
adverse possession of real estate might have had more force in the past 
when comprehensive recording or title registration systems did not exist.  
The United States has had deed recording since colonial times.109  
Recording provides permanent evidence of title that does not fade or 
disappear with time.  If adequate record evidence exists, the lost 
evidence rationale for adverse possession does not apply. 
Adverse possession has served to clear a multitude of old claims of 
record.  But it clears these claims regardless of their validity.  And the 
long-term adverse possession doctrine does not formally take into 
account the merits of the possessory claims it protects.  The usual 
approach is that it is irrelevant under long-term statutes whether the 
adverse possessor has any plausible claim to the title other than through 
the possession of the property. 
By using records maintained in American recording or title 
registration systems, it is normally possible to identify with a high 
degree of accuracy the legal interest holders and adverse claimants and 
                                      
107 Thomas W. Merrill & Henry E. Smith, The Morality of Property, 48 WM. & MARY L. REV. 
1849, 1876 (2007). 
108 See Merrill, supra note 63, at 1128. 
109 John L. McCormack, Torrens and Recording: Land Title Assurance in the Computer Age, 18 
WM. MITCHELL L. REV. 61, 67 (1992). 
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the nature of their interests or claims.110  Recordation of a document 
usually raises a rebuttable presumption that it was duly executed.111  The 
certificate of acknowledgement, usually required by law for instruments 
to be entitled to recordation, not only contains evidence of valid 
execution, but it is a self proving document, admissible into evidence 
without any additional foundation being necessary.112  Consequently, 
recordation provides presumptive evidence of title, placing the burden 
on the party contesting record title to produce evidence to prove that 
title is other than shown in the record.113  In a number of states, record 
title is further buttressed by marketable title or curative acts that make it 
more difficult to challenge record title or that cure defects in recorded 
documents.  Clearly, the modern policy is to prefer record title to non-
record claims.114  When the legal titleholder can be so identified and the 
validity of the holder’s claim readily proved it is doubtful whether the 
adverse possession claimant should prevail solely on the basis of the 
“lost evidence/quieting title” rationale. 
There are many instances where the doctrine of adverse possession 
has cleared record titles held by parties in possession from conflicting 
claims, record and off record.115  But it is not a very efficient title clearing 
doctrine because its application requires a set of often complex factual 
findings.116 
                                      
110 See JOHN E. CRIBBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROPERTY 343-
44 (3d ed. 1989) (stating how recording systems have worked well enough to preclude a 
switch to title registration, which has almost completely failed in the United States). 
111 See, e.g., Ferrell v. Stinson, 11 N.W.2d 701, 703 (Iowa 1943). 
112 CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 110, at 206. 
113 Ferrell, 11 N.W.2d at 703; TIFFANY & JONES, supra note 31, at § 1044. 
114 Adverse possession of real estate appears counter to this policy. 
115 See ROBIN PAUL MALLOY & JAMES CHARLES SMITH, REAL ESTATE TRANSACTIONS 486-91 
(2002).  Marketable title acts can do this, also, without getting involved in the uncertainties 
and ambiguities involved in the application of the doctrine of adverse possession.  Id.  For 
example, under adverse possession, whether an owner is or was under a legal disability at 
the time the adverse claim was asserted may be important, but it is irrelevant under a 
typical marketable title act.  Id.  Marketable title acts operate by cutting off most interests 
that were recorded before the “root of title” unless the interests were preserved by re-
recording after the root.  Id.  The root of title is a definite time period plus some additional 
time back to the most recent title transaction.  Id.  The definite time periods range from 
twenty-two to fifty years.  Id.  Generally, the claims of parties in possession are not 
extinguished.  Id.  But if an adverse possessor is no longer in possession, the adverse 
possession claim may be extinguished.  Id.; see also Walter E. Barnett, Marketable Title Acts—
Panacea or Pandemonium, 53 CORNELL L. REV. 45 (1967) (providing a good critique of 
marketable title acts). 
116 CALLAHAN, supra note 39, at 76.  Adverse possession will not quiet a possessory title if 
the possession has been for less than the period of the applicable statute of limitations.  Id.  
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On the other hand, adverse possession is a double-edged sword 
when it comes to quieting title.117  It may work in favor of a possessory 
claim to real estate against an apparently good record title, thus making 
the record title uncertain and in need of quieting.  Furthermore, 
recording acts do not protect good faith purchasers from the risk that 
there may be a fully ripened adverse possession claim against real estate 
purchased for value even if there is no longer any indication of the 
possession.118 
3. Psychological, Economic, and Reliance Based Rationales 
The reliance rationale has been discussed by a number of authors.119  
There are different versions of it.  Some focus on the reliance of third 
parties that presume that the possessor is the owner.  Other versions 
consider the reliance of the possessor.  Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes 
focused on the reliance of the possessor who, “like a tree in the cleft of a 
rock, gradually shapes his roots to his surroundings, and when the roots 
have grown to a certain size, can’t be displaced without cutting at his 
life.”120 
According to various commentators, the phenomenon described by 
Justice Holmes, coupled with other factors, supports the doctrine of 
adverse possession.  In one version, adverse possession may prevent a 
breach of the peace.  The possessor has become so attached to the 
                                                                                    
Even if the possessory claim is older than the time period in the statute of limitations, 
adverse possession will not quiet it unless the statute has run.  Id.  One or more of the 
requirements of adverse possession may be unsatisfied or the running of the statute of 
limitations might have been suspended by the adverse claimant’s disability.  Id.  Generally, 
statutes of limitation also do not run against the holders of future interests.  Id. 
117 MALLOY & SMITH, supra note 115, at 483. 
118 Mugaas v. Smith, 206 P.2d 332 (Wash. 1949).  See also L.S. Tellier, Annotation, Title by 
Adverse Possession as Affected by Recording Statutes, 9 A.L.R. 2d 850 (1950).  Stating that: 
The rule is well settled that title by adverse possession is not affected 
by recording statutes—that the adverse title once obtained is good 
even as against those holding a title recorded as provided by statute, 
or a title derived from a recorded title—and this, regardless as to 
whether or not the adverse holder continued in actual or visible 
possession after having perfected his title by adverse possession 
Id. 
119 Merrill, supra note 63, at 1131-32. 
120 Letter from Oliver Wendell Holmes to William James (Apr. 1, 1907), reprinted in THE 
MIND AND FAITH OF JUSTICE HOLMES: HIS SPEECHES, ESSAYS, LETTERS AND JUDICIAL 
OPINIONS 417, 417-18 (Max Lerner ed., 1943). 
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property that an attempt by the titleholder to assert rights may lead to 
violence.121 
Another related rationale attempts to explain adverse possession on 
the basis of loss aversion theory and related psychological 
experiments.122  Briefly, the core of this explanation is that the 
experiments show that people prefer to keep what they have rather than 
exchange it for something else of apparently equivalent value.  
Experiments also show that the subjective impact of losses is greater than 
equivalent gains.  Additionally, experiments indicate that people 
perceive a greater loss when they are denied tangible objects than when 
they are denied intangibles of the same value.  From this, it is concluded 
that “when forced to place a loss on someone, the law chooses to deprive 
R[ightful] O[wner] of his financial asset rather than deprive 
A[dverse]P[ossessor] of her tangible asset.”123 
The proponent of this rationale, Professor Jeffrey Evans Stake, 
admits that the theory “is far from perfect.”124  In addition to the 
problems Stake identifies, there is a basic question that should be 
addressed.  How does loss aversion subjectively perceived by possessors 
form legal doctrine, court decisions, and statutes?  The judges and 
legislators who made the law did not face the potential loss themselves.  
Did the people who made the doctrine apply norms derived from how 
they would feel if they were in the shoes of the true owner and the 
adverse possessor?  Finally, versions of adverse possession appear in 
ancient cultures, medieval England, and in various diverse cultures 
throughout the present world.  It is possible that the results of the 
psychological experiments that Professor Stake relies on may be 
culturally influenced or determined.  The same experiments may yield 
different results when the subjects are of a different society and culture.  
If so, then they may not explain the adverse possession rules of that 
society. 
Professor Stake’s loss aversion theory of adverse possession is 
preliminary and incomplete.  Nevertheless, at the very least he has 
identified a path of inquiry that may lead to an increased understanding 
of adverse possession and perhaps other legal doctrines. 
                                      
121 See Merrill, supra note 63, at 1131 (explaining that under the personality theory of 
property rights, it has been argued that the adverse possessor may also have an attachment 
to the property that is critical to the possessor’s personal identity). 
122 See Stake, supra note 63, at 2471. 
123 Id. at 2434-56. 
124 Id. at 2469. 
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There are also reliance rationales that make use of economics.  Some 
economic theories focus on investments (e.g., construction or 
improvements) made by the adverse possessor in the property.125  If the 
adverse possessor has to buy the land to protect the investment, the true 
owner may be able to require the possessor to pay the owner not only 
the value of the land, but also the non-salvageable cost of the investment 
(quasi-rents).  It is claimed that the amount of the recovery by the true 
owner is unfair because it is a disproportionate penalty for the wrong 
committed and is economically inefficient.126 
Suppose it is assumed that this theory provides a rationale for 
adverse possession in typical encroachment cases or other instances 
where the adverse possessor made valuable improvements on the land.  
The theory still does not explain adverse possession where the possessor 
acquires the land without making any valuable improvements or 
investments.127  Furthermore, if an improvement is involved, removal 
may not be required even if there is no adverse possession right giving 
the possessor the right to leave it in place.  The remedy of the owner may 
be limited to damages.128 
Finally, Thomas Merrill has identified another flaw in the argument: 
it does not take into account the significance of the passage of time.  To 
ripen into ownership, adverse possession must continue for at least the 
time period provided in the applicable statute of limitations (e.g., ten 
years).  However, the problem of appropriation of rents and strategic 
bargaining will arise the moment the adverse possessor completes the 
permanent improvement even if a great deal of time must pass in the 
future before the statute of limitations will run out. 
                                      
125 Id. at 2434-56 (providing some economics based arguments which may explain or 
support the doctrine of adverse possession). 
126 See Merrill, supra note 63, at 1131; Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 97, at 161. 
127 See Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 97, at 167. The authors state that “[s]ome states 
require the presence of improvements or enclosure for the possessor to satisfy the open and 
notorious requirement.  This also conforms with the theory, because improvements are the 
primary source of appropriable quasi rents.”  Id.  This includes sunk costs, the value added 
by the improvement which the title owner might be able to demand from the possessor in a 
bargain to sell the possessor the property.  Id.  Of course, most states do not require the 
presence of improvements or an enclosure, and in some an enclosure requirement may be 
satisfied by a cheap wire fence, hardly a significant “quasi rent.” Id.  See also TIFFANY & 
JONES, supra note 31, at § 1138. 
128 See, e.g., Penelko, Inc. v. John Price Assocs. Inc., 642 P.2d 1229 (Utah 1982) (owner not 
entitled to an injunction ordering possessor to remove improvements because that would 
involve substantial economic waste and damages would be adequate). 
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Merrill refers to another category of reliance interests, those of third 
parties who may have an interest in whether ownership has transferred 
from the title owner to the possessor.  Merrill mentions “vendors, 
creditors, contractors, tenants, [and] subsequent purchasers of all or part 
of the property for value.”129  Merrill does refer to the availability of 
reliable ownership information in public records.  “But it simply is not 
feasible to expect every interested third party to perform a title search 
before extending credit to, providing services for, or purchasing an 
interest from someone who appears to be a T[rue] O[wner].”130 
Merrill’s comment is overly general.  It is rare for anyone to purchase 
a valuable real estate interest without a title search and examination, 
included in the package of services title insurance companies normally 
provide.131  When a borrower intends to secure a lender by a mortgage 
on real estate, the lender will almost always demand a title search and 
examination.  On the other hand, there are some situations of the type 
described by Merrill, where there could be reliance on possession 
inaccurately indicating ownership.  A lender, in assessing personal 
credit, with no mortgage involved, may consider the value of real estate 
possessed by the person without ordering a title examination.  However, 
the creditor may not even verify that the borrower is actually in 
possession of the subject property.  In such cases, there would be no 
reliance on possession as indicative of title. 
4. The Reliance Rationale is Really a “Reliability” Rationale 
One of the problems with reliance rationales for adverse possession 
is that no proof of reliance is required by the legal doctrine.132  This is 
because the legal doctrine is not aimed at protecting specific actual 
reliance on a possessor being the owner.  However, what commentators 
refer to as “reliance” is at the foundation of a variety of legal doctrines 
including adverse possession,133 common law marriage, and perhaps 
other doctrines such as equitable adoption134 or promissory estoppel.  
                                      
129 Merrill, supra note 63, at 1132. 
130 Id. 
131 See Robin Paul Malloy & Mark Klapow, Attorney Malpractice for Failure to Require Fee 
Owner’s Title Insurance in a Residential Real Estate Transaction, 74 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 407 
(2000). 
132 See, e.g., N.Y. REAL PROP. ACTS. LAW §§ 512 & 522 (1979). Cultivation, improvements, 
or construction of enclosures may be required as proof of possession, but there is no need 
to show that these acts were in reliance on having ownership.  Id. 
133 See Gerstenblith, supra note 6, at 124. 
134 See generally Jan Ellen Rein, Relatives by Blood, Adoption, and Association: Who Should Get 
What and Why, 37 VAND. L. REV. 711, 766-806 (1984) (discussing equitable adoption). 
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“Reliance” may be involved, but the term does not describe or identify a 
primary interest at stake.  The doctrines support the reliability of social 
expectations derived from “the language of interaction” as well as 
attaching consequences to changes of position in reliance on such 
expectations.  If people are treated or act like owners or married people 
for some period of time, then they, and third parties, may expect to some 
level of probability that they are owners or married.  From this 
perspective, the reliance explanation should be called the “reliability” 
rationale. 
Lawyers tend to think of material reliance as involving a change in 
position of the party to the party’s detriment.  In social interaction, there 
may be reliance, detrimental or otherwise, on behavioral norms as 
applied to particular facts.  However, such norms may be enforced 
regardless of reliance on them. 
B. The Meaning of Reliability a.k.a. “Reliance” 
The general doctrine of estoppel is one of the most familiar legal 
doctrines based on reliance.  A contract version, promissory estoppel, 
makes some promises enforceable even though they are not in contracts 
based on consideration.135  The heart of traditional promissory estoppel 
is “action or forbearance on the part of the promisee. . .” to the 
promisee’s detriment, i.e., detrimental reliance.  Sometimes promises 
may be enforced even though there is no consideration or demonstrated 
detrimental reliance.136 
Adverse possession or informal marriage may also involve reliance, 
perhaps detrimental reliance.  An adverse possessor may rely on being 
the owner by, for example, constructing an improvement on the land.  
Third parties may rely on the possessor being the owner by extending 
credit to the possessor.  In an informal marriage, one or both of the 
parties may rely on being married by failing to formalize the marriage or 
                                      
135 See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 90 (1981). 
136 Id.  See also Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory Estoppel: Contract 
Law and the Invisible Handshake, 58 U. CHI. L. REV. 903 (1985).  After analyzing over two 
hundred promissory estoppel cases, Professors Farber and Matheson concluded that courts 
did not always require actual detrimental reliance as a prerequisite to enforcing certain 
promises on the basis of promissory estoppel.  Id.  Other scholars have questioned their 
research and conclusions.  See, e.g., Juliet P. Kostritsky, The Rise and Fall of Promissory 
Estoppel or is Promissory Estoppel Really As Unsuccessful As Scholars Say It Is: A New Look at the 
Data, 37 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 531 (2002); Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the “New 
Consensus On Promissory Estoppel: An Empirical And Theoretical Study, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 580 
(1998). 
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by declining to execute wills or trusts that will confer at least the 
equivalent of a surviving spouse’s share.  Third parties may rely on the 
couple being married by, for example, a title insurance company 
insuring that they hold title as tenants by the entirety, an estate available 
only to married couples. 
But proof of reliance on having the legal status of “owner” or 
“spouse” is required by neither adverse possession nor common law 
marriage doctrine.  Both doctrines require publication of the 
ownership137 or marriage138 claim, but no proof at all of whether anyone 
has relied on the claim is required.  Publication, however, creates a 
potential for reliance.  Expectations may be enforced not only because 
people have relied on them; they may also be enforced so that people 
may rely on them.139  Social science theory helps to explain how and why 
this occurs. 
1. Property and Marriage are Similar Social Institutions 
The function of marriage in social organization is well and widely 
understood.140  It is also useful to think of property ownership as an 
aspect of social organization.  Property or property-like rights are 
“necessary, if only to organize the world in ways that all individuals 
know the boundaries of their own conduct.”141  Property rules define the 
relationships between persons with respect to the subjects of property, 
tangible and intangible.  Property rules may be laws, but customary 
rules or norms may confer property-like rights.142 
Marriage creates something like a property relationship between the 
spouses.  Certain property aspects of marriage are readily apparent and 
                                      
137 Adverse possession must be “open and notorious.” 
138 Common law spouses must “hold themselves out” to the public as being married. 
139 Lon Fuller & William R. Perdue, Jr., The Reliance Interest in Contract Damages: 1, 46 
YALE L. J. 52, 62 (1936). 
140 Marriage is the basis of the family.  In preliterate times, it served as an important 
component of kinship organizations, e.g. tribes and clans.  Marriage served to cement 
alliances between tribes and clans and that function continued after the rise of the modern 
state.  Marriage enabled kinship relations not based on blood, real or fictional.  See EDWARD 
B. TYLOR, ANTHROPOLOGY 247 (Leslie A. White ed., 1960) (1881).  For example, in Europe, 
members of ruling classes of various nation states cemented alliances by intermarriage 
between families.   Id. 
141 Richard A. Epstein, Possession as the Root of Title, 13 GA. L. REV. 121, 123 (1979). 
142 See Carol M. Rose, Possession as the Origin of Property, 52 CHI. L. REV. 73, 81 (1985) 
(describing a Chicago “property-like” claim based in custom: “In my home town of 
Chicago, one may choose to shovel snow from a parking space on the street, but in order to 
establish a claim to it one must put a chair or some other object in the cleared space.”). 
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well-known.  For example, in all but one of the common law marital 
property states, the surviving spouse has the right to claim an elective 
share of the decedent spouse’s estate.143  In the community (or marital) 
property states, the earnings of spouses are pooled at the instant of 
acquisition and are equally shared. 
However, the relationship between property and marriage involves 
more than just some inter-spousal property rights.  Property and 
marriage are both social and legal institutions founded on behavioral 
norms.144  These norms create legally or socially based expectations 
between owners and other persons in society.  They also create such 
expectations between marriage partners and other people. 
2. The “Language of Interaction” is the Foundation of Both Adverse 
Possession and Common Law Marriage 
The term “social structure” has various meanings.  In this Article, the 
term is used to refer to normative patterns that describe the expectations 
that people should have about the probable behavior of other people in 
particular situations or contexts.145  Social organization requires 
behavioral predictions.  In various contexts, people must be able to 
anticipate what is expected of them and they must be able to predict 
what others are likely to do.  These socially derived predictions should 
be reasonably reliable.  The required degree of reliability and specificity 
depends on the context.  Team sports, such as basketball and football, 
and military operations usually require a high degree of predictability of 
behavior among persons on the same team or side.  The participants 
must be able to accurately anticipate the behavior of the people on their 
side and, to the extent they can, that of their opponents as well, in a fluid 
context. 
                                      
143 See GA. CODE ANN. §§ 53-1-3, 53-2-9(b) (1997); see also Peter H. Strott, Preventing 
Spousal Disinheritance in Georgia, 19 GA. L. REV. 427 (1985); Mary F. Radford & F. Skip 
Sugerman, Georgia’s New Probate Code, 13 GA. ST. U. L. REV. 605 (1997). 
144 FULLER, supra note 14, at 148.  The term “norm” is used in at least two different senses 
in sociological discourse.  Id.  In one sense, it refers to rules assigning legal or social 
consequences to certain described acts.  Id.  In the sense used here, “behavioral norm” 
refers to shared beliefs about what people may expect of others’ particular social 
encounters.  Id.  Lon Fuller defined “social norm” to include “precepts eliciting dispositions 
of the person, including a willingness to respond to somewhat shifting and indefinite ‘role 
expectations.’”  Id.  See also LOPEZ & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 24-26 (providing a further 
discussion of the meaning of “norm” as used in this latter sense). 
145 LOPEZ & SCOTT, supra note 15, at 3. 
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The specificity of the predictions needed also depends on the 
context.  A complex manufacturing operation requires sophisticated and 
detailed ordering which may include, among other organizers, multiple 
and complex contracts and detailed directions based on custom or 
written rules.  On the other hand, informal social gatherings may 
function satisfactorily with nothing more than the expectations derived 
from some general rules of etiquette. 
Legal scholars have observed the importance of socially generated 
expectations and the part they play in organizing society.146  One of Lon 
Fuller’s nine principles of social ordering was “[t]he coordination of 
expectations and actions that arises tacitly out of interaction; illustrated 
in ‘customary law’ and ‘standard practice.’”147  According to Fuller, some 
“rules of customary law . . . serve directly to regulate, and set limits to, 
man’s purposively directed interactions with one another.”148  Fuller 
described customary law as “a language of interaction,”149 stating: 
To interact meaningfully men require a social setting in 
which moves of the participating players will fall 
generally within some predictable pattern.  To engage in 
effective social behavior men need the support of 
intermeshing anticipations that will let them know what 
their opposite numbers will do, or that will at least 
enable them to gauge the general scope of the repertory 
from which responses to their actions will be drawn.  We 
sometimes speak of customary law as offering an 
unwritten code of conduct.150 
3. Social Norms are the Source of the Language of Interaction 
The term “social norm” has various meanings.151  The term may be 
used to refer to behavioral rules that ascribe particular sanctions if the 
                                      
146 See, e.g., LON L. FULLER, ANATOMY OF THE LAW 73 (Frederick A. Praeger ed., 1968); 
Hubert Rottleuther, A Purified Sociology of Law: Niklas Luhmann on the Autonomy of the Legal 
System, 23 LAW & SOC. REV. 779, 783 (1989). 
147 FULLER, supra note 14, at 170. 
148 FULLER, supra note 14, at 73. 
149 FULLER, supra note 14, at 213. 
150 Id. (quoting an essay Fuller wrote in 1969). 
151 FULLER, supra note 14, at 148.  The expression “social norm” may be used “to embrace 
indifferently, on the one hand, rules attributing legal or social consequences to overt and 
specifically defined acts, and, on the other, precepts eliciting dispositions of the person, 
including a willingness to respond to somewhat shifting and indefinite ‘role expectations.’”  
Id. 
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rule is not obeyed.152  For the purposes of this Article, the term is used to 
refer to rules or standards establishing expectations that guide 
interaction. 
Legal commentators usually distinguish “law” from “social 
norms.”153  As used herein, a custom is a type of social norm.  Social 
norms may also be laws if adopted as such by governments.154  Through 
this process, a single customary rule may also become, or serve as a basis 
for, a separate rule of law.  The custom is not wiped out simply because 
it has served as a basis for a governmentally adopted law.  For example, 
suppose there is a custom that when two drivers arrive at an intersection 
at the same time, the driver on the left yields to the driver on the right.  
The custom may later become the basis of a law to the same effect.  
People may continue to follow the custom without any idea that there is 
an identical or similar law.  Sometimes people will guide their behavior 
in accordance with customary norms with little or no regard for formally 
promulgated ones.155  Law, of course, influences custom and may 
supersede it. 
C. Statuses, Roles, and Social Positions 
1. Spouses and Owners Occupy Social Positions 
Some social scientists use the terms “status” and “role” to refer to 
defined positions in social systems and the expected behaviors 
                                      
152 See, e.g., ROBERT C. ELLICKSON, ORDER WITHOUT LAW: HOW NEIGHBORS SETTLE 
DISPUTES 126-27 (1991). 
153 See, e.g., ELLICKSON, supra note 152, at 127; RICHARD POSNER, FRONTIERS OF LEGAL 
THEORY 288 (2004). 
154 See, e.g., THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 1-205 (Standard Version 2003).  The UCC 
may make a “usage of trade,” a custom, a legal norm.  Id.  Courts also make customs law 
when they adopt customs in making decisions.  At the time of adoption, the custom and 
the law may remain identical or diverge, then or sometime later. 
155 For example, when the author worked as a supply clerk in the U.S. Army, he observed 
that the supply department followed customary rules with infrequent reference to the 
printed rules promulgated by the Army (which were quite complex and somewhat 
incomprehensible).  See ELLICKSON, supra note 152, at 131.  Under Robert Ellickson’s 
classification, the printed rules could be classified as either organization rules or laws.  Id.  
Custom may also diverge from legally enforceable contract rules.  For example, in 
residential real estate transactions in the Chicago area, it was customary for the buyer’s 
lender to order the title insurance even though the routinely used sales contract forms 
required the seller to procure and present the preliminary report or commitment for title 
insurance.  Formally, the seller was obliged, but it was expected that the buyer’s lender 
would actually order the title insurance. 
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associated with those positions.156  “Roughly, a role involves a patterned 
set of expectations regarding modes of behavior as well as the mental 
states, such as intentions, desires, and beliefs, that are thought to 
properly underlie or accompany the expected behavior.”157  Class or 
social position identifiers and their associated norms enable people to 
predict how others are likely to behave in particular contexts.158  These 
predictions provide guidance about how people should behave in return. 
Marriage and property ownership are social institutions.  
“Institutions are social arrangements that channel behavior in prescribed 
ways . . .”159  They are composed of interrelated elements: norms, values, 
and role expectations that contribute to the maintenance of social 
order.160  It is obvious that “wife,” “husband,” and “spouse” may refer to 
particular social positions.  It is not so apparent that property ownership 
may be defined in social position terms.  The key is to focus on the social 
relations involved and not on the things of value, the subjects of 
property.  When a person occupies a particular “property” social 
position, the norms that define the position also generate expectations 
about how the occupant and other members of society should behave 
toward the property and each other.161 
2. Identifying Social Positions 
Before people can anticipate the behavior of others, they must be 
able to comprehend signals that identify status, class membership, or 
other categories that denote expected behaviors.162  For example, the 
rules of etiquette apparently followed by an individual may identify 
status (i.e., social position) or class.163  Dress is a common way that 
people identify status or class membership.  In some organizations, dress 
                                      
156 Robert K. Merton, The Role-Set: Problems in Sociological Theory, 8 BRIT. J. SOC. 106, 110 
(1957). 
157 Meir Dan-Cohen, Between Selves and Collectivities: Toward a Jurisprudence of Identity, 61 
U. CHI. L. REV. 1213, 1218 (1994). 
158 LESLIE A. WHITE, THE EVOLUTION OF CULTURE 227 (1959). 
159 D. Stanley Eitzen & Maxine Baca-Zinn, Social Institutions, in CONFLICT AND ORDER 47 
(9th ed. 2006). 
160 Id.  Eitzen and Baca-Zinn describe how they think institutions evolve over time.  Id.  In 
their view, institutions develop because they generate expectations that promote social 
stability.  Id. 
161 See Harold Demsetz, Toward a Theory of Property Rights, 57 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1967). 
162 Edwin J. Thomas & Bruce J. Biddle, Basic Concepts for the Properties of Role Phenomena, 
in ROLE THEORY: CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH 46, 49 (Bruce J. Biddle & Edwin J. Thomas eds., 
1966). 
163 Kingsley Davis, Social Norms, in ROLE THEORY: CONCEPTS AND RESEARCH 105, 109 
(Bruce J. Biddle & Edwin J. Thomas eds., 1966). 
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identifiers are very clear and precise.  Perhaps the best examples are 
military and certain religious organizations.  Uniforms indicate the 
military or organization the wearer belongs to, and rank insignia clearly 
signal the exact social position (or status) in a hierarchy of positions. 
3. Identifying Spouses and Owners 
Although documentary evidence may exist to identify a couple as 
married, people normally rely on how a couple behaves toward each 
other to identify them as married in ordinary social interaction.  The 
behavioral norms indicating a marriage relationship are not uniform 
through time and social contexts and the message they send is not that 
the parties are certainly married, but that there is some probability that 
they are.  The probability depends on the specific context.164  Except in a 
few situations, there is no “clear set of norms . . . in the social 
stratosphere that uncontroversially mark[s] some relationships as marital 
and others as nonmarital . . .”165  Only when valuable property interests 
are involved is it likely that marriage certificates may be required as 
proof of marriage.  Even then, interested parties may accept “acting 
married” as sufficiently indicative of the fact of marriage. 
In lawsuits where the fact of marriage is in issue, a certificate of 
marriage will not conclusively establish the fact.  A marriage certificate is 
only prima facie evidence of marriage.  In some cases, that evidence will 
not be enough.  If there is evidence that there was no marriage, it may be 
necessary for a court to establish the fact of marriage based on testimony 
or other evidence.  If a marriage certificate is not introduced into 
evidence, a marriage can still be proved.166  In both cases, “acting 
married” provides the proof that the couple was married. 
Property ownership may be revealed from documents and from 
governmentally maintained records but, like the behavior of persons 
apparently married to each other, possession is commonly used in 
ordinary social interaction to identify probable owners.  But more 
                                      
164 Generally, the signals that a relationship is a marriage may include, among others: 1) 
there are two persons and no more in the relationship (polygamy is prohibited); 2) they are 
of opposite gender (if gay marriage becomes more common, this signal will lose 
significance); 3) the couple spends a lot of time together (this may be signaled by how they 
speak to each other and what they say); 4) it appears that they cohabit at least some of the 
time; 5) they have a long standing relationship; 6) they are not of widely different 
chronological ages; and 7) they may imply that they are married or may state it explicitly. 
165 Dubler, supra note 50, at 973. 
166 Stein, supra note 12, at 281.  Proof of cohabitation and holding out by the couple that 
they are married may raise a presumption that a valid ceremonial marriage took place. 
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evidence will be required where valuable interests may be at risk if there 
is no ownership or the ownership is defective or incomplete. 
The social foundation of both adverse possession and common law 
marriage is the language of interaction.  Possession, perhaps joined with 
other indicia of ownership, creates an expectation that the possessor is 
the owner.  A couple that “acts married” is considered married by other 
people and not parent and child or brother and sister.  In both situations, 
the common factor is not reliance, which may be involved, but 
publication of signals received in the context of social norms that identify 
a probable owner or married couple.  Adverse possession must be “open 
and notorious” and common law marriage doctrines require a “holding 
out” to others that the couple is married. 
VI. CONCLUSIONS 
A. Adverse Possession Should Be Limited and Common Law Marriage Should 
Be Expanded 
This Article has shown that the foundation of the legal doctrines of 
adverse possession and common law marriage is social norms that 
generate expectations that certain possessors are owners and some 
couples are married.  This is not an exclusive and comprehensive 
explanation of adverse possession, common law marriage, their 
recognition, non-recognition in particular cases, and all the forms they 
may take. 
Ultimately, this Article concludes that in its present form, the legal 
doctrine of adverse possession of real estate is no longer justified by 
present social and economic conditions.167  The doctrine has been handed 
down from a past when documentary proof of title was nonexistent or 
often hard to access, a time when land title record systems did not exist.  
Accordingly, possession played a greater role in publicizing claims to 
ownership.  People still have some expectations that possessors are likely 
owners.  However, better evidence of ownership will be required when 
valuable economic or other interests are at stake.  The adverse possession 
doctrine should be reformed in light of current policies and prevailing 
social and economic conditions.  Long-term adverse possession should 
                                      
167 Adverse possession of personal property is also permitted and there are no central 
registries of personal property interests equivalent to those maintained for real estate.  
Personal property, like people, is movable, thus making the design and administration of 
central registries for personal property more difficult. 
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be abolished and short-term adverse possession should be modified by 
focusing on its utility as a title-clearing device. 
Generally, property law should promote the policies of security of 
ownership and facility of transfer.  Security of ownership means that title 
to property should not be diminished or lost except through the 
consensual act of the owner or through some specific legal process, such 
as foreclosure, condemnation, or execution.  Facility of transfer means 
that purchasers and certain other transferees should be able to acquire an 
interest in real estate promptly, inexpensively, and with assurance that 
the title is as indicated by the official land title records. 
Adverse possession works against these policies as well as in their 
favor.  It promotes the security of title claims of those in possession.  But 
it also works to coercively strip even record owners of title, sometimes 
without requiring the possessors to be in good faith.  It promotes facility 
of transfer by clearing some titles, but it also clouds other titles and 
creates a risk that there is a matured adverse possession claim that will 
be good even against a good faith purchaser of the land, even though 
there is no physical or record indication of the claim.168 
Adverse possession is also contrary to the modern policy favoring 
record title over adverse non-record claims.  Additionally, the 
expectations of the possessor, and other people, that the possessor is the 
owner, may not be entitled to great weight given the effectiveness of 
modern land title record systems in publicizing the ownership claims of 
record owners.  The recording and title registration systems in the 
United States indicate the actual state of titles with a high degree of 
reliability. 
It is arguable that adverse possession of real estate should be 
completely abolished.  A Torrens system of title registration operated in 
Illinois for almost 100 years without adverse possession.  Currently, in 
Minnesota, what is probably the best managed Torrens title registration 
system in the United States operates very well without any doctrine of 
adverse possession.169  However, both the Minnesota and Illinois Torrens 
                                      
168 Title insurance will usually cover this risk but real estate buyers want land not 
insurance claims. 
169 The author is referring to Hennepin County (Minneapolis), Minnesota.  This statement 
is mainly based on a personal visit by the author of this Article to the Hennepin County 
Torrens office in 1990 and published references by others to the office. 
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systems used possession-based approaches to handle some disputes 
involving boundaries and implied easement claims.170 
1. Boundary Disputes are Better Settled by Practical Location of 
Boundaries Doctrines than by Long-term Adverse Possession 
Long-term adverse possession has been justified as a boundary 
dispute settlement device.171  The doctrine of practical location of 
boundaries is an alternative tool that does not have the negative aspects 
of adverse possession.  Generally, practical location of boundaries cannot 
be used to “steal” a tract of land and does not have as much potential for 
creating title problems.  Experience with Torrens in Minnesota indicates 
that some form of the doctrine of practical location of boundaries—a 
fraternal twin of adverse possession—may be an economically efficient 
and desirable way of dealing with some boundary and related disputes. 
There is a need for some doctrine to deal with boundary disputes.  
Surveying is an art, not an exact science.  A survey is really a 
professional opinion about, among other things, the location of 
boundary lines.172  Locating a boundary line is not just a simple matter of 
reading a legal description and using it to draw a line on the ground.173  
                                      
170 Carter v. Michel, 87 N.E.2d 759 (Ill. 1949) (unregistered implied easement claim only 
apparent from possession); Bergh, supra note 17, at § 3.24.  Minnesota’s practical location of 
boundaries doctrine as applied to Torrens registered land is quite narrow.  See In re Petition 
of Building D. Inc., 502 N.W.2d 406 (Minn. Ct. App. 1993). 
171 TIFFANY& JONES, supra note 31, at § 1155 (1975).  Short-term adverse possession under 
color of title is not an effective boundary dispute settlement tool.  Id.  When color of title is 
required, the invalid instrument or other writing under which the claimant holds defines 
the scope of the claim including its boundaries.  Id.  An adverse possessor under color of 
title is deemed to have constructive possession of the entire tract described in the writing.  
Id.  However, constructive possession extends only to the portion of the described tract the 
claimant intends to possess that is not in possession of another.  Id.  Furthermore, 
possession in excess of the boundaries described in the instrument giving color of title is 
not adverse as to such excess.  Id.  Therefore, short-term adverse possession under color of 
title does not apply to settle boundary disputes where the boundaries on the ground are in 
conflict with the boundaries described in the instrument giving color of title.  Id. 
172 Mitchell G. Williams & Harlan J. Onsrud, What Every Lawyer Should Know About Title 
Surveys, in LAND SURVEYS: A GUIDE FOR LAWYERS AND OTHER PROFESSIONALS 3 (Mitchell G. 
Williams ed., Amer. Bar Ass’n 2000); see also JOYCE PALOMAR, 1 PATTON AND PALOMAR ON 
LAND TITLES § 152 (West 2007). 
173 See LYLE W. MALEY & WILLIAM A. THUMA, LEGAL DESCRIPTIONS OF LAND 23 (Chicago 
Title and Trust Company 1966) (1955).  When land is platted, boundary location is usually 
simplified.  Id.  But the location of the boundaries is still a matter of professional judgment: 
It has been well said that THERE IS NO MAGIC IN A RECORDED 
PLAT.  The plat is subject to errors, uncertainties and conflicts.  It is but 
a picture, drawn by the surveyor from the field notes he made when 
surveying and staking out the subdivision.  It and the field notes are 
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The surveyor’s opinion is based on examination of historical and other 
documentary evidence and the physical condition of the property.  
Surveyors may reasonably disagree about the location of boundary lines 
because they have different professional opinions.  And, of course, 
surveyors sometimes err when determining the locations of boundaries.  
Consequently, legal descriptions in conveyancing documents will not 
always be perfectly consistent and reliable. 
It would be costly or inconvenient to have a final administrative or 
judicial determination of boundaries at the time a document containing a 
legal description is recorded or registered under a Torrens act.  The 
determination will involve not only the owner of the subject property 
but also owners of adjacent properties.174  Normally, adjacent property 
owners do not have to be notified when conveyancing documents are 
recorded in a recorder’s office or registered under a Torrens act.175  
However, if there will be a determination of boundaries that will be 
binding on them, they should be given notice and an opportunity to be 
heard.176  Involving adjacent owners might create costly litigation that 
otherwise might never arise.  Additionally, boundary disputes 
frequently involve small amounts of land.  Therefore, some doctrine, 
such as practical location of boundaries, is needed to resolve, efficiently, 
boundary disputes when they do ripen into actual controversies.  
Practical location doctrines also tend to confirm actual expectations of 
the adjoining landowners.177  Finally, these doctrines are an economically 
desirable way of minimizing the cost of boundary and building line 
                                                                                    
secondary evidence of his acts; the primary evidence consists of his 
‘official footsteps,’ namely the monuments (usually stones or iron 
pipes) in the ground, that he located or planted to mark the lines and 
corners of the subdivision. 
Id. 
174 If the rights of adjacent owners are going to be adjudicated, it will be necessary to give 
them notice and opportunity to be heard under due process provisions of state or federal 
constitutions. 
175 See, e.g., BERGH, supra note 17, at § 3.32 (discussing how neighbors have to be notified 
when there is an application to register boundaries, either upon initial registration or in a 
proceeding subsequent to registration). 
176 See Texaco v. Short, 454 U.S. 516 (1982); Wichelman v. Messner, 83 N.W.2d 800 (Minn. 
1957).  Notice and opportunity to be heard is required by due process clauses of state and 
federal constitutions.  Id. If the determination of boundaries was not binding for a long 
time, notice and opportunity to be heard at the time of the determination might not be 
required.  Id. 
177 See Wichelman, 83 N.W.2d at 800 (describing how Minnesota, which does not permit 
adverse possession of land registered under its Torrens Act, does apply the doctrine of 
practical location of boundaries to some boundary dispute cases involving land registered 
under its Torrens Act). 
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errors involving encroachments.178  Long-term adverse possession 
should be replaced by practical location of boundaries doctrines with 
modifications that might be necessary.179 
2. Short-Term Adverse Possession is Necessary to Clear Titles of 
Parties in Possession Under Color of Title 
On the other hand, short-term adverse possession in some form is 
still necessary to clear titles of parties in possession under color of title.  
There is no ready replacement for it as is the case with long-term adverse 
possession.  One of the fundamental principles of Torrens title 
registration is called “curtain.”  Once a title transfer is registered the 
registration is largely conclusive —the title is as registered.  The current 
registration provides a curtain between the present and past transactions 
involving the title.  Normally, it is unnecessary to go back and examine 
the history of past transactions to determine the current state of the title.  
With some important exceptions, past claims not appearing in the 
current registration are extinguished.  Short-term adverse possession is 
the closest counterpart to this for titles maintained under the recording 
acts found in all states. 
The defects cleared by short-term adverse possession may be record 
or off record.  Some examples are a claim that a transferor received only 
a life estate and not a fee under a prior recorded conveyance180 or a 
ripened adverse possession claim that is not recorded or publicized by 
current possession.181  There is simply no other legal device that can 
provide the title clearing function that adverse possession does.  
Recording acts only work to clear titles of prior unrecorded claims that 
could have been recorded.182  Marketable title acts only clear some claims 
that are not recorded after a point in the fairly distant past called the 
“root of title.”183  Additionally, marketable title acts have exceptions for 
certain interests that are not cleared even if they last appeared in the 
record before the root of title. 
                                      
178 See Miceli & Sirmans, supra note 97, at 162-65. 
179 See Lawrence Berger, Unification of the Doctrines of Adverse Possession and Practical 
Location in the Establishment of Boundaries, 78 NEB. L. REV. 1 (1999) (proposing unifying 
practical location doctrines and long-term adverse possession). 
180 See, e.g., Ellis v. Bartlett, 172 N.E.2d 768 (Ill. 1961). 
181 See, e.g., Mugaas v. Smith, 206 P.2d 332 (Wash. 1949). 
182 JOHN L. MCCORMACK, RECORDING, REGISTRATION & SEARCH OF TITLE, THOMPSON ON 
REAL PROPERTY § 92.04 (David A. Thomas ed., 2002). 
183 Id. at § 92.11. 
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Short-term adverse possession is not as likely as long-term to create 
defects that undermine the recording act policy that title claims should 
be recorded.  Commonly, the instrument giving the possessor color of 
title will be recorded.  Long-term claims do not have to be evidenced by 
writings and even ripened ones do not have to be of record. 
The current law of short-term adverse possession needs some fine-
tuning.  The statutes from state to state share the “color of title” 
requirement, but the cases indicating what the term means are not 
consistent.  There is also no unanimity about what else should be 
required.  Some statutes require the possessor to be in “good faith” or to 
have paid the property taxes.  This is an appropriate case for the 
development of a model or uniform statute by some appropriate body.  
The persons who might develop the model statute should be guided by 
an understanding that it should be aimed at providing the curtain that 
Torrens title registration laws provide by making the title as registered 
largely conclusive.  They should also be sensitive to avoidance of title 
clouding effects of adverse possession. 
3. Common Law Marriage Should be Retained and Extended to More 
Jurisdictions 
Common law marriage protects the legitimate expectations of the 
parties and of the people who interact with them.  Third party reliance in 
common law marriage situations is more entitled to protection than such 
reliance in adverse possession because of the unavailability of adequate 
records that could be used to search the titles of marriages.  Thus, the 
doctrine should be retained and extended to more jurisdictions. 
Judicial economy and administrative convenience do not justify 
prohibition of informal marriage.  People acting like they are married 
may be the best available evidence that they are married.  Not all formal 
marriages are certified, and certificates of them may be lost or 
unavailable.  Marriage certificates are not very reliable evidence of the 
existence of a marriage as of a particular time.  Verifying the facts about 
a marriage from public documents is more difficult than confirming facts 
about real estate ownership from them.  Land does not move which 
makes it easier to centralize the appropriate records.  By contrast, 
marriages may be formed or dissolved in many places around the world.  
The cost involved in proving an informal marriage in court is not usually 
very great.  Furthermore, laws permitting registration of informal 
marriages, as in Texas, would allow informal marriages to be certified 
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removing any administrative or proof advantage that certified formal 
marriage presently has. 
Other reasons given for prohibiting common law marriage—
prevention of fraud or protection of the family—are also not very 
persuasive.  Common law marriages must be publicized by the parties 
“holding themselves out” as married to third parties, and that is equal to 
the protection against fraudulent claims of marriage provided by 
witnesses to an official ceremony and registration of a formal certificate.  
There is insufficient evidence that formal marriage requirements do 
more to protect the family than those applicable to the formation of 
common law marriages.  It is remotely possible some public health 
interest might be served by marriage license health test requirements for 
marriage licenses.  However, this interest may be outweighed by privacy 
interests. 
In a time when the state has moved away from regulating the 
internal relationship of marriage partners, prohibition of common law 
and other informal marriages is the anachronism.  The power of the state 
should not be used to coerce conformity to particular ideas about the 
proper circumstances under which people may relate to each other 
privately unless there is a sufficient state interest that justifies the 
intrusion.184 
Professor Cynthia Bowman and others have stated that the people 
who erroneously expect that they are common law spouses are likely to 
be poor or members of minority groups.185  It appears that that there may 
be group social norms recognizing common law marriage in conflict 
with prevalent norms in some situations.  Defeating the expectations of a 
couple and people who interact with them reasonably believing that they 
are married should be justified only by some substantial countervailing 
interest.  And, in the view of this author, no such interest has been 
identified. 
                                      
184 For example, to protect minors, the state can set a minimum age for consent to a 
marriage, formal or common law. 
185 Bowman, supra note 51, at 709-10, 765-70. 
